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Abstract
Development projects usually benefit when expertise is drawn from diverse sources, 
including potential users. Orchestrating the involvement of disparate groups requires 
finding a balance between differentiation, when teams work separately , and 
integration, when groups meet to exchange knowledge. This article argues that a 
“community of practice” perspective can help project managers achieve this balance, 
by drawing attention to the assumptions, interests, skills, and formal and tacit 
knowledge of the different groups involved. Using a case study as illustration, we 
show that integration can be achieved by ensuring that the developing technology is 
comprehensible to all groups concerned, and that it satisfies their various interests.  
Keywords 




The success of complex technology development projects depends heavily on 
the ability of team members to interact productively so that relevant knowledge can 
be acquired, generated and circulated in a timely and cost-effective fashion. Often, 
projects benefit from the integration of expertise from different specialisms [1,2], 
including potential users.  In this article we demonstrate how a “communities of 
practice” perspective can help project managers to maximize the fruitfulness of the 
relationships that are crucial to knowledge exchange in complex projects. As 
Nidumolu et al.[3] noted recently, there is a “ground beneath” knowledge 
management that consists of the situated contexts in which the production and 
exchange of knowledge occur. The management of complex projects requires an 
appreciation of this ground, so that degrees of engagement among diverse groups 
can be varied over time. This involves a balance between differentiation – when 
communities work in relative isolation from one another – and integration – when 
they are brought together to exchange knowledge and skills. A communities of 
practice perspective draws attention to the social processes that produce 
differentiation, as well as processes that facilitate productive integration. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we briefly discuss the characteristics of 
communities of practice. We then consider different ways of organizing technology 
projects as alternative ways of structuring communities and establishing channels 
of communication among them.  To illustrate how a community of practice 
perspective can facilitate an understanding of the issues involved, we draw on a 
case study of a project that was carried out in a manufacturing firm in Australia.  
As the project progressed, its organization was characterized by a shift in emphasis 
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from differentiation to integration.  The flows of knowledge generated by this shift 
turned out to be quite different from those envisaged at the outset. Despite this (or 
more accurately, because of it) the project succeeded. While it is important to 
specify and pursue technical goals, complex projects are also social enterprises. 
Applying a communities of practice perspective to our case study, we highlight 
some of the social processes that contributed to success – the use of brokers to 
bring diverse communities together, and the importance of aligning interests around 
the technology that is being developed.
Situating Knowledge and Skills –  Communities of Practice 
The concept of communities of practice has recently gained attention as a way 
of explaining how knowledge and learning develop in specific social contexts [4, 
5,6,7].  According to Wenger [5, p. 45], 
Over time, … collective learning results in practices that reflect both the 
pursuit of our enterprises and the attendant social relations.  These practices 
are thus the property of a kind of community created over time by the 
sustained pursuit of a shared enterprise.  It makes sense, therefore, to call 
these kinds of communities communities of practice (emphasis in original).
Communities of practice are organised around circumscribed sets of activities 
and their members are generally in direct contact with each other. They develop 
their own routines, formal and informal “rules”, and stores of shared assumptions 
and knowledge.  Over time, they often create their own languages, which may 
contain jargon and colloquialisms whose meanings are obscure to outsiders. As a 
result of learning, practices evolve. However, community members may also import 
knowledge from similar communities or more disparate sources. The extent to 
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which a community of practice learns internally or imports new knowledge is in 
part a function of the nature of the practices it undertakes. In many complex 
technology projects, knowledge acquired from external sources, that is, from other 
communities of practice, is crucial.   
Projects and Communities of Practice 
It is important to distinguish between projects and communities of practice. 
There are differences in personnel,  goals, and how they located in time.  Projects 
are more clearly instrumental than communities of practice. A project may be 
defined as “any undertaking that has definite final objectives representing specified 
values to be used in the satisfaction of some need or desire” [8].  What 
distinguishes a project from many other activities is that it has a defined point at 
which it is completed.  
Projects also differ from communities of practice in their ad hoc nature.  They 
have no collective history (although some members of the project may share a 
history), and no collective future.  Nevertheless, the people who work on a project 
may belong to a number of communities of practice.  For example, in a matrix 
organization, the membership of functional teams extending beyond the project 
remains explicit for many project participants. The extent to which a community of 
practice is involved in project activities can vary, with clients perhaps only 
peripherally associated, while team managers may devote virtually all of their 
attention to the project.  Communities of practice operating within a project allow 
for concentrations of expertise.  However, a high degree of differentiation may 
make it difficult for participants to develop project-wide goals if members of 
particular communities are too focused on internal concerns.  
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Varieties of Project Organization 
Project organisations have been used since “cavemen formed a project to gather 
the raw material for mammoth stew” [9, p. 7]. Formal interest in project 
management grew during and after the Second World War as a result of a number 
of gigantic development undertakings, many of which were defence related [10]. 
Depending on size and complexity, projects can be organised differently. Meredith 
and Mantel [9] describe three basic types of organisation.  One is to assign a project 
to a functional section of a larger organisation, for example to give it a “home” in 
the engineering division or the accounting department.  Secondly, a project may be 
accommodated in a pure project organisation, a separate, largely self-contained 
section that is devoted exclusively to the project and will be disbanded when the 
project is completed or abandoned.  Finally, projects may be run on a matrix basis 
in which control rests with a project manager but the bulk of the human and other 
resources are “borrowed” from different sections in the larger organisation. Hobday 
[11] has refined this into six different forms, including three types of matrix 
organisations. Regardless of the form a project organisation takes, however, 
problems of managing connections among people with different areas of expertise 
remain.  
The baseline for technology development processes, against which more recent 
commentators have reacted, is a model of sequential interdependence [12], in which 
downstream stages depend on those that precede them but there is no reciprocity.  
When this is the case, planning, development, manufacturing, marketing, and use 
can all be planned without reference to what might happen later.  From the 1980s, 
however, increased competition from Japanese firms suggested that sequential 
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organisation was too time-consuming [13,14,15,16]. Alternatives were developed. 
Stalk and Hout [13], for example, established rules for design teams that included 
mixed membership across functional areas, co-location of team members and other 
ways of achieving quicker and tighter co-ordination.  Similarly, Smith and 
Reinertsen [17] advocated cross-functional groups that brought together marketing, 
development and manufacturing representatives from the onset. In this way, 
opportunities for the transfer of tacit as well as formal  knowledge are enhanced 
[18,19].
In recent decades, the role of potential users in the process of technology design 
has gained increasing attention [20, 21, 22, 23].  In theory, different relationships 
between users and developers are possible, spanning the spectrum from complete 
differentiation to close integration. Sometimes, technologies can be successfully 
developed without any contact with potential users [24]. Provided the new products 
are comprehensible and easily integrated, minimal interaction between developers 
and users need not to be a barrier to adoption [23, p. 98]. On the other hand, when 
new technologies and the systems into which they are to be introduced are 
complex, lack of knowledge exchange can lead to considerable problems. Millions 
of dollars have been wasted on technologies that were never successfully adopted 
[23, p. 98-99, 25].
To counteract these problems, various levels of user participation in design and 
implementation have been advocated. In some cases, users are so heavily involved 
in the design of a technology that they are, in effect, co-developers [23, p. 100-
102]. In general, however, users lack the expertise to carry out development 
activities themselves, especially when advanced technical skills are required. 
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Connections between developers and users are thus likely to fall somewhere 
between the two extremes of complete differentiation and total integration.  
While integration may, in theory, facilitate more efficient sharing of 
knowledge, there are obstacles that must be overcome. Leonard-Barton [23] has 
pointed out that people within communities develop particular mindsets and 
“signature skills” that are, in part, products of their professional training. Indeed, 
they are the means through which group members distinguish their own activities 
from those of others. The problem for project managers is to overcome barriers to 
communication created by the existence of groups with quite different skills, 
languages, expectations and assumptions. Some authors [17, 26] have argued that 
different arrangements are appropriate depending on circumstances.  In some 
situations, differentiation, balanced with collaboration rather than integration, may 
be beneficial. Quinn et al.[26] for example, cite complexity as a major reason for 
the success of what they call “independent collaboration” in innovative situations. 
“In an increasing number of innovations … complexity is so high (as in advanced 
physics, aerospace, communications, or biotechnology projects) that teams, as they 
are ordinarily defined, cannot cope as well as collaboration among a large number 
of relatively independent units” (p. 107).
Clearly, there is no “one-size-fits-all” prescription for effective project 
management. In complex projects at least some differentiation is advantageous, as 
it facilitates the concentration of expertise. However, as Lawrence and Lorsch [27], 
Chandler [28] and Galbraith [29] have all emphasised, differentiation also requires 
collaboration and/or integration. This is widely recognised in the project 
management literature [30, 31, 32]. To illustrate some of the issues associated with 
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differentiation and integration in complex technology projects, we turn now to our 
case study. The case highlights the importance of managing flows of knowledge 
between two important groups that are almost always involved in projects – 
technology developers and end-users. The relationship between these groups is 
frequently quite delicate, and many projects have failed because it has not been 
managed well.
Research Methodology 
The first and third authors were involved with the IMS project from mid-1996 
to November 1998. As management academics with an interest in the social aspects of 
technology design, we were contracted by the developers of the IMS to help them 
organise a factory trial of the new technology. [Name] took a leading role in arranging 
and conducting meetings and workshops, while [name] acted solely as a non-
participant observer and analyst. Our methodology could be characterised as reflexive 
action research [33]. During the IMS trial period, one or more members of our 
research team [include footnote with other names] spent more than 20 days with the 
developers and/or factory personnel. A variety of activities were involved – 
conducting meetings and workshops, and collecting data through observations and 
interviews, and from documents produced by the R&D team and the IMS test factory. 
All researchers took notes and recorded their reflections of events.  
The IMS Case Study - Differentiation and the Identification of ‘Human 
Factors’ risks 
The organisation in which we conducted our research is a well-established, 
large and diverse mining and manufacturing company.  The bulk of its factories 
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and mines contain complex mixtures of old and new equipment. During the 1990s, 
the company supported a number of in-house R&D laboratories, in which more 
advanced experimental technologies were built and tested. The intelligent 
manufacturing system (IMS) was one of these. It consisted of a set of 
interconnected computers and software designed to provide finely-tuned control of 
a continuous manufacturing process. In its fully-functioning form, the computers 
would be attached to pieces of equipment at critical points along the process.  They 
would gather and exchange data about the equipment and the process, and adjust 
settings to optimise the functioning of the system as a whole. For example, if a 
valve in one piece of equipment was worn or broken, the IMS would be able to 
adjust settings elsewhere to compensate [34].  
The IMS R&D team was established by senior company executives in 1994.  
The initial aim was to build a system in a laboratory setting so that its capabilities 
could be explored. This would allow the company to be an “intelligent customer” 
of the technology in the future, and also to influence standards if and when the 
technology became commercially available. The R&D team consisted of 8 
qualified computer scientists who, by virtue of their shared expertise, common task 
and close interaction, constituted a community of practice. In the laboratory, they 
used simulated data and a scaled-down model of a manufacturing process to build 
an experimental IMS. They did so without reference to the factory operators who 
would eventually use the technology, should it ever be installed. At this stage, the 
major “users” of the project’s output - arguably information rather than a working 
artifact – were senior company executives. In this specialized environment, the 
concentration of expertise facilitated rapid development of the software. Because 
the technology worked well in the simulated conditions, a decision was made to 
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test it in an actual manufacturing site. This would yield further, and probably more 
relevant, information about its capabilities. This decision introduced a new group of 
users, and a new set of challenges with respect to knowledge transfer and learning.  
The employees at the test site, which was more than 1,000 km away from the 
company’s main research laboratories, comprised another distinct community of 
practice.  The site was selected because its manufacturing process was relatively 
stable and well understood. Sufficient data were available at various points along 
the process to make an IMS feasible.  Nevertheless, the developers realized that 
implementation would not be straightforward. In the past, there had been 
considerable problems with the transfer of technology from laboratories to work-
sites within this company.  The factory chosen for the IMS trial had, some years 
earlier, been the site of an unsuccessful technology transfer. In 1988, employees 
were sent on a holiday while the factory was upgraded. No-one told them what was 
happening. When they came back, they found a new product tracking device that 
simply did not work. They tried to fix it, and, in their own words, “created a 
monster”.  It took years of tinkering to make the device useful.  The drama 
surrounding the installation was still notorious almost a decade later, when the 
factory was chosen as the site of the IMS trial.  
By 1996, when planning for the trial began, the company was conducting “risk 
reviews” in an effort to prevent such problems. The IMS risk review identified a set 
of “human factors” risks as particularly important.  They included fears that the 
IMS “won’t be simple enough for staff for handle”, that its “continued use [would 
lead to] operator deskilling” and that there would be “inadequate preparation of 
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end-users”.  After the meeting, the developers summarized these concerns into a 
single statement of risk - that “end users do not adopt the technology”.
By identifying the possibility of user rejection, the risk reviewers had implicitly 
acknowledged the existence of a separate and distinct community of practice at the 
test factory, whose actions with regard to the new technology were unpredictable.
Moreover, because of the problems created by the company’s traditional “leave it at 
the doorstep” approach to technology implementation, relationships between 
factory workers and technology developers were often characterised by suspicion 
and distrust. To overcome these barriers, the developers employed a mechanism 
that is frequently used by people trying to establish connections across the 
boundaries of different communities of practice. They engaged brokers – a group of 
academics from [site withheld] who were contracted to “reduce the risks of user 
opposition or lack of involvement” in the IMS trial.  This contractual obligation, 
together with statements made at the risk review, give important indications of the 
developers’ view of their relationship with the users at this early and crucial phase 
of the project.  They assumed that the flow of knowledge would be uni-directional.
That is, for the trial to work, the users would have to be educated to accept and 
operate the IMS.
Brokering – Bringing Communities Together
Wenger [5, p. 109] defined brokering as the “use of multimembership to 
transfer some element of one practice into another”. In our case, our ability to 
facilitate the transfer of elements of practice did not depend on our being members 
of the communities involved. Indeed, our legitimacy was probably enhanced by our 
status as “outsiders”.  Non-membership does have disadvantages, however.  The 
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early stages of our involvement were characterized by some confusion, as we 
struggled to familiarize ourselves with the worldviews, expectations and motives of 
the developers on one hand, and the people working at the test site on the other. As 
Wenger [5, p. 109] notes,
The job of brokering is complex. It involves processes of translation, 
coordination, and alignment between perspectives. It requires enough 
legitimacy to influence the development of a practice, mobilize attention, and 
address conflicting interests.  
These observations remain valid whether the brokers are imported from 
outside, as was the case in the IMS project, or whether they emerge from within the 
communities themselves. The important point is that integration of knowledge 
across communities requires a great deal of work in creating and maintaining social 
relationships. It is not merely a technical task.
Between May 1997 and February 1998 we and other participants in the IMS 
project arranged a series of “boundary encounters” [5, p. 112] – meetings, 
telephone calls, workshops and other activities that facilitated exchanges of 
information among groups. At first, there was some confusion, as perspectives 
were not aligned. The developers were primarily interested in conducting a trial 
that was valid and meaningful for them.  Initially, however, the manager at the test 
site was reluctant to participate, thinking that the trial would be “a pain in the arse”. 
In his experience, new technology often “arrived at the doorstep and it’s never as 
good as they say it’s going to be”. Subsequently, however, he changed his mind. It 
is often difficult to ascertain people’s motives, but there are several reasons why he 
may have chosen to assist the trial. Firstly, supporting innovation would have 
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helped his career. Secondly, the risk review workshop and our involvement as 
brokers demonstrated that this particular technology was not going to just “arrive” 
and cause problems for factory operations because of a lack of care with 
integration. Thirdly, the test factory managers had been conducting team-building 
exercises aimed at improving productivity and morale. The activities associated 
with the trial could provide another opportunity for eliciting greater operator 
interest and involvement in the running of the factory.  Finally, there were technical 
reasons to support the development of more sophisticated computer control. The 
manufacturing process at the factory was rapid,  and several key pieces of 
equipment had to be finely tuned and coordinated. There was considerable tacit 
skill involved in providing the optimal equipment settings. The IMS computers 
could potentially help with this, thereby enhancing productivity and 
competitiveness.  
Gaining the support of the factory manager was an important early step in 
preparing for the trial. However, the cooperation of the operators was also required.  
As the risk review noted, there was a distinct possibility that the workers at the test 
site would not,1  or could not, do what was required to produce a valid test of the 
technology. Equipment upgrades in the company had often meant job losses. 
Greater computer control over the manufacturing process could mean that valuable 
tacit knowledge would be lost as operations became more automated. The IMS was 
also technically complex. The R&D team was concerned that operators “would 
need a degree in computer science” in order to work the technology, even if they 
were prepared to incorporate it into their normal daily activities. 
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Ensuring the alignment of the operators was our major task as brokers. 
However, we had our own perspectives on the IMS and the trial. Influenced by 
traditions of humanistic user-centered technology design, we wanted to make sure 
that the needs, aspirations and preferences of the factory personnel were taken into 
account.  In other words, we wanted to steer the project in a direction that would do 
more than just elicit operator compliance. To this end, we negotiated opportunities 
to introduce and discuss methods for improving technology design by taking 
greater account of the needs and preferences of users [35, 36]. However, because 
the IMS was already fairly well-developed, the scope for the use of these methods 
was minor. Despite this, discussion of the methods did provide a focus for direct 
productive interaction between the developers and users.2 They helped to break the 
ice and made later communication easier.  One of the developers was based close to 
the factory site, and became a regular conduit of information. As the 
communication channels became more developed, the technologists began to learn 
from the operators.  On several occasions, the company provided funding for 
employees to fly more than 1,000 km to the research laboratories to view the 
simulated factory process and the IMS prior to its installation. We were not present 
at these meetings, and our information about them is derived from what others have 
told us. The visits were, apparently, quite significant in contributing to the success 
of the trial. One of the factory workers who made the trip said “to be honest, the 
thing wasn’t really anything like [the plant]. It was completely devoid of the way 
we do things. Similar principle, but...”. According the technologists, “eight or nine” 
details of the IMS and the trial were changed as a result of the visits.  The 
1 Leonard-Barton [23, p. 46] describes a case in which the introduction of new 
equipment at a aluminium plant was sabotaged by the workforce.  Similar sabotage 
had occurred in the past at the firm that developed and tested the IMS
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developers’ plans to use the IMS to completely control the process were dropped, 
as the operators convinced them that it would not be feasible. Instead, the IMS 
would suggest equipment settings, and the operators had the option of accepting or 
rejecting them.  
The trial, when it came, was a success. The operators cooperated, and the 
developers were able to “prove the concept” of the IMS by demonstrating that 
when aspects of the manufacturing process were varied, the technology was able to 
suggest equipment settings that compensated for the variations.  This situation was 
in marked contrast to the debacle of the product tracking device that was installed 
in 1988. The major difference between the two projects was the amount of care 
taken with the IMS to ensure a productive integration of the knowledge and 
practices of technology developers and users.
Connecting Communities by Aligning Interests around Boundary Objects 
The varieties of project organization outlined earlier, and the strategies for 
involving users discussed above, are all concerned with managing the balance 
between differentiation and integration. It is unlikely that a single form of project 
organization will prove effective in all circumstances. Given this contingency, 
project managers would be well advised to pay attention to the social ground 
beneath the production and exchange of knowledge, namely the communities of 
practice that are involved in technology projects. There are two related aspects of 
project management that we believe are particularly pertinent to the achievement of 
successful integration. Firstly , it is important to try to align the interests of the 
2 This phase is described in more detail in [37, 38,39].
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different groups involved. Secondly, interests need to be organized productively 
around the central focus of the project, that is, the developing technology itself.
Abstract “needs” for information transfer do not, in themselves, propel action. 
The needs must be recognized as such by the actors involved, who must initiate 
actions that allow exchanges to occur. In the IMS project, the developers 
recognized a need to transfer knowledge into the community of users. They 
engaged us as brokers, and a mutually acceptable alignment of interests was 
negotiated through a contract that allowed us to pursue some of our own goals in 
exchange for ensuring operator cooperation with the trial. However, and most 
importantly, we also had to align the interests of the factory personnel. Our strategy 
of broadening the scope of the project to include a consideration of principles of 
user-centred design seemed to work.  It provided opportunities for the operators to 
influence the final stages of the design of the IMS, and planning for the trial. As 
one of the factory workers said, “It’s the first time we’ve actually been asked for 
input. And I will admit that it’s good to get away from the bloody day-in, day-out 
grind to actually do something different”. This quotation hints at another reason the 
men (they were all men) supported the trial. It provided relief from boredom. They 
held competitions between themselves and the technology to see which could 
suggest the most effective equipment settings. According the developers, the results 
were “neck-and-neck”, a situation that would probably have provoked further 
competition (that is, cooperation with the trial) . Finally, the technology was highly 
experimental. It was not going to remain at the site, and there were no immediate 
prospects of job losses or deskilling. The fact that the technology could potentially 
assist, rather than replace, operators might also have been a factor in the acceptance 
of the trial. 
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The establishment of friendly relationships between developers and users, 
however, is irrelevant if technologies remain alien and ineffectual for those who are 
supposed to use them. In other words, when highlighting the importance of human 
relationships in technology development projects, it is important not to lose sight of 
the overall goal – the production of a useful, working artifact. For successful 
integration to occur, the technology must function as a “boundary object”.  This is 
an object that  is “both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of 
the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common 
identity across sites” [40, p. 393].  The importance of this mutual comprehensibility 
is illustrated by the case of the failed product tracking device that was installed in 
the test factory in 1988.  It may have worked perfectly well in the research 
laboratory, but it was not robust and plastic enough to be integrated into its new 
environment. 
In the IMS project, the IMS itself functioned as a boundary object. The 
negotiation of meanings around this central object constituted the integration of 
knowledge that contributed to the production of a viable, working technology. The 
integration was facilitated by actual physical contact with the object itself. 
Demonstrations of the IMS in operation were organised for factory personnel 
before the trial, using simulated data and a scaled-down model of the 
manufacturing process. These demonstrations provided valuable opportunities for 
tapping into the accumulated expertise possessed by the factory workers. As one of 
the technology developers noted, the factory operators raised “issues about the 
complexity of the mill versus our simulation that we hadn’t considered”.  They 
were able to make final adjustments that ensured a smooth passage of the 
technology from the research laboratory into the test factory. The details of the 
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knowledge that needed to be transferred for the trial to succeed could not be 
predicted in advance. However, by crafting opportunities for people from the two 
groups to mingle and establish social relationships, the project managers created 
conditions conducive for the alignment of interests, and the identification and 
closure of gaps in knowledge. 
Summary and Implications for Managing Complex Technology Projects 
Analysts generally agree that the design of new technologies can be enhanced 
by integrating knowledge and skills from a variety of sources. Potential users are 
often depicted as a particularly rich and relevant source of knowledge, and much 
effort has been devoted to defining the conditions under which productive relations 
between developers and users can be established and exploited [20, 21, 41]. 
Creating a sensible balance between differentiation and integration is part of this 
endeavor, and a variety of project forms may be effective in enabling and enhancing 
timely communication and cooperation. However, to optimise relations between 
different groups, project participants need to construct integrating institutions based 
on effective mental maps of the social landscapes in which projects are conducted. 
A community of practice perspective can assist with this endeavour. 
The importance of taking communities of practice into account is illustrated by 
the case study, which includes varying levels of understanding on the part of 
developers of the existence and potential contributions of communities of users. Three 
primary communities of practice were involved in this instance, the developers of the 
IMS, the major corporate sponsors (who were also users in an abstract sense), and the 
people in the plant in which the IMS was tested. The earlier failure to install a 
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tracking device in the factory suggested that the developers needed to take care to 
consult the users effectively on this occasion.  The knowledge limitations inherent in 
the developers’ community of practice meant that they could not fully comprehend 
the practical implications of using the IMS within the broader system of work 
undertaken in the factory.  If this were the only gap between the communities of users 
and developers, the IMS as a boundary object might on its own have served as an 
integrating agent to bring about a shared understanding leading to necessary 
modifications in the IMS.  In this case, however, more was needed because the social 
landscape in the factory, among both managers and workers on the shop floor, created 
substantial skepticism towards the objectives of the project as a whole.  For their part, 
the designers viewed the users through lenses coloured by their own interests and 
worldviews. That is, they saw the users as either resistant or compliant, not as active 
contributors of knowledge.  Thus brokers were needed as a further integrating agent, 
to help generate an environment in which both communities of practice were willing 
to concentrate on operationalising the boundary object rather than focusing on their 
own narrow preconceptions. 
All complex projects need people to act as brokers, transferring and translating 
knowledge, and aligning interests and perspectives as projects move through phases 
of differentiation and integration.  In the final testing and implementation stages,  
these activities should be directed towards ensuring the technology is comprehensible 
to people in the relevant communities,  and that it is flexible enough to accommodate 
their  different needs and preferences. Further research is needed on strategies that 
brokers can use to facilitate productive integration.  This requires field work, as 
factors influencing success and failure may not be entirely ‘rational’. For example, the 
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capacity of the IMS to relieve boredom was a factor in the success of the trial. Only 
by exploring more fully the social dimensions of crafting new technologies can we 
create appropriate integrating agents to optimise conditions for productive 
engagement by diverse communities of practice. 
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